The first formulation is the most natural expression of what it is I mean to say. The third is parallelized. The second is the mean.
To be me is not the same as for my body to be.
Being me is not equivalent to my body being.
The being of me is not equivalent to the being of my body.
The significance of the first is quite natural and pre-philosophic knowledge for any man. There can be no honest denial of the valid epistemological category for subjective being-- "what is it like to be....in paris? a drunkard? a newt?" But most of all, of course, "what is it like to be you?"--"What is to be you?" I am not asking about the being of your body, if I were I would be much better off asking a physicist or a biologist.
I know that this sort of being-talk is reminiscent of the modern phenomenologists, and I grant that they have true things to say. But they, in particular Heidegger, fail and fail consistently and fail to the point of slander to understand or even try to understand the pre-moderns. Similarly, this article at Vox Nova gives way too much credit to Descartes, and his so-called subjective turn. Maybe I'll get around to a full critique.
